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SUPREME COURT OF nm STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN 
-. ·-·--·--·· ·-------·----·---· --·-· ••• ····-·--------.•.. ----·------X 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF 
ROBERT LUDLOW, 84 /\ 2527, 
Petitioner, 
FOR A JUDGMENT LJNDER ARTICLE 78 OF THE 
CfVfL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES 
-against-
ANDREA D. EVANS, CHAlRWOMAN OF THE 
BOARD OF PAROLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS A 
MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK STATE 
DEPARH.-fENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
COMMUi'rlTY SUPERVISION, 
Respondent. 
-··-----. ---- -----.•• ··-·------------------.... -----···-••. ----·-· --X 
APPEARA ... 'ICES: Robert Ludlow, 84 A 2527 
Woodboume CorrectionaJ faciiity 
99 Prison Road, PO Box I 000 
Woodbourne, NY 12788 
Petitioner, prose 
LR.Buda, J. 
Attorney General for the State of New York 
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 l 
Poughkeepsie, N.Y. 12601 
By: Tracy Steeves, AAG, of counsel 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Petitioner seeks Article 7 8 relief to overturn his parole denial arguing, Inter ulla, rhat the 
parole board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner submitted a Verified Petition 
with exhibits. Respondent submitted an Answer and Return 
Petitioner is currently incarcerated in Woodboume Correctional Facility. He was 
convicted by guilty plea of robbery in the second degree, and by jury verdict, guilty of Murder in 
the Second Degree, At1empted Assal!lt in the First Degree (two counts), Criminal Possession of 
Weapon in the Second Degn:e, and Criminal Possession of Weapon in the Third Degree. New 
York County Supreme Court sentenced Petitioner 10 un aggregate term of 25 years to life in state 
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prison. The instant offense occlU'led in 1983, when Petitioner shot a store owner after a dispute 
regarding marijuana. 
Petitioner appeared for his third parole interview on November I, 2011 . By lUlanimous 
decision the pa.role board denied release. Petitioner timely filed an administrative appeal, to 
whlch he did not receive a timely reply, and then timely submitted the within petition. 
In this proceeding, Petitioner argues that the board1s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, irrational and bordered on impropriety. Petitioner asserts: (1) the board ignored 
statutory mandates by failing to apply the mandatory risk and needs assessment; (2) the board 
failed lo consider his rehabi!it,ative efforts and any inquiry was perfunctory; (3) the board 
erroneously focused on his criminal history and the instant offenses and failed to use a forward-
looking analysis regarding his rehabilitation and readiness for release; ( 4) the board failed to 
apply the procedures mandated by Executive Law §259-c(4); and (5) the record did not support 
the board's decision. 
Parole Lnw 
Executive Law, Section 259·i(2)(c}(A) states in pertinent part: 
In making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to 
subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of th.is article shall require 
~1al tlie follov.ing be considered: (i) the insti1ut1onal record including program 
goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, 
training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonaJ relationships with staff 
a.Tld inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, employment, 
education and training and support serv'ices available to the inmate .... 
The parole board must also consider whether "there is a reasonable probability that, if such 
inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of sociecy and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his 
crime as to undermine respect for rhe Jaw." 9 NY CRR 8002.1. 
In reaching Its decision, the board must also consider: 
(a) the inmate's institutional record; 
(b) the inmate' s release plans; 
(c) any slatement made to the boa.rd by the victim's representative; 
(d) the seriousness of the offense, with consideration of the sentence and the 
recommendation of the sentencing court; and 
(e) the inmate' s prior criminal record. 
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Parole Boards have very wide discretion to grant or deny parole release; the board decides 
how much weight to give each of the factor:i lislcd above. PhJ/lips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d [1" 
Dept. 2007]. lt is aJso not n~cessary tJiat the board expressly discuss each of the factors or any 
guidelines in its determination. Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360 f3'~ Dept. 1998]. An inmate 
bears the heovy burden of establishing lhat the determination of a parole board was the result of 
"irrationaJity bordering on impropriety." lvltltrer of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N. Y.Zd 470 {2000]; 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 I 1980]. Nonetheless, the reasons for 
denying parole must "be given in detail and not in conclusory terms." Executive Law, Section 
259-i(2)(a); Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304 ( P1 Dept. 2005}; Malone v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
719 12•d Dept. 2011). 
The standard of review in regard to pro-ole rell!ase is whether lhe decision was so 
irrationaJ as to border on irnpropri~ty. Matter of R1'sso v. New Yori' State Board of Parole, SO 
NY2d 69 [1980J; Epps v Travis, 241 AD2d 738 (3rd Dept. 1997]; Malter of Silmon v. Travis, 
95 N\12d 470 j2000J. \Vhen considering the various facfots, the weight accorded to any 
particular factor is solely within a parole board's discretion. Matter of Santos v. Evans, 81 AD3d 
1059 13'" Dept. 2011 J; Matter of Wise v. New York State .Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 (3rd 
Dept. 2008] . Ir.eluded in such factors are the seriousness of the instant offense(~) and an inmate's 
criminal history. Executive Law §259·1(2)(A). 
In 201 l, the legislatW'e made changes to Executive Law, §259. The changes to 
Executive Law, §259-c(4) became effective on November l, 2011. In essence, those 
modifications now require that parole boards (I) consider lhe seriousness of the underlying crime 
in conjunction with the otl-ler focrws enumerated in the statm.e, Executiv~ L aw, §259-1(2), and 
(2) conduct a risk assessment analysis to determine if an inmate has been rehabilitated and is 
ready for release. Executive L2w, §259·(c)(4). The changes were intended to shift the focus of 
paroh: boards 10 a fonvard-thinking paradigm, ratht:r than a backward looking approach to 
evaluating whether an inmate 1s rehabilitated and ready for release. 
Such changes, l1ow~ver, were by no means intended to limit parole boards' historic and 
well -established authority and independent judgment when considering and applyillg the 
statutory factors in parole matters. JJeop/e v.1.a11kford, 938 NYS2d 784 [Sup. Ct. Brou~ Co. 
20121. Referring to rhe 2011 changes to the Executive Law, the Lankford court stated, "the 
legislation makes clear that the board shall continue to exercise its independence when mttking 
snch decisions. The new agency's provision of administrative support will not undennine the 
board's independent decisio n-making authority (see, Laws of 20 I ! , Part C, Sub. A, § l )."Id., at 
788, citing Tlmalttts v. New York Stare Board of Parole, 934 NYS2d 797 [Sup. Ct. Orange 
Co. 2011 ]. Pa.role rllllease has been, and remains, a discretionary fw1ction of a ptuole board. 
Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 934 NYS2d 797 [Sup. Ct. Orange Co. 2011). 
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Disctmion 
Petitioner's claim that the parole board's decision was arbitrary e.nd capricious is 
unsuppo11ed by the record. 0Yerall, the record demonstrates the hearing and parole board's 
decision complied wiU1 the statutory provisions of Execuiive Law, §§259-c and 259-i. Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Board of Parole, supra. Petitioner has not met the heavy burden of 
establishing the parole board failed to fo llow the statutory guidelines. Matter of Silmon v. 
Tra~·is, supra, There is nothing in the record to suggest that the parole board did not consider all 
of the factors when making its decision. 
In Petitioner's case, the serious nature of the instant offenses, his federal probation status 
at the time of the offenses, and his substantial criminal history were appropriate factors for the 
parole board to consider and ro give much weight. Matter of Marcus v. Alexander, 54 AD3d 
476 [3'c1 Dept. 20081; Gardiner v. New York State Div. Of Parole, 48 AD3d 871 (3'd Dept. 
2008]. The record indicates the parole board considered various facto rs, including the seriousness 
of Lile crime, Petitioner's positive programing, completion of all DOCCS programs, overall good 
disciplinary history and educarional/trnining achievements. Contrary to Peti1ioncr's arguments, 
lht:: board was well with.in its discretion 10 consider Petitioner's past and escalating violent 
criminal history. See, Simmons v. Travis, 15 AD3d 896f4'h Dept. 2005J. The parole board was 
also well within its discretion to afford each factor whatever weight it deemed appropriate; 
piecing more weight on the nature or seriousness of the m1derlying offenses was not a violation 
of any case or statutory law, including the 201 J amendments to the parole Jaw. Matter of Santos 
v. E'Xms, supra; Matter of Wise~·. New York State Division of Parole, supra; Executive Law 
§259-(c)( 4). 
The amendments to Executive Law §259-(c)(4) became effective in November, 201 l. 
The new requirements addt'tss the net!d for the board to establish written procedwes that include 
a risk and needs analysis ~o determine when an irunate is ready for release. The amendments do 
not change the factors considered by the board, nor do they alter the historic discretion pa.role 
boards have when considering release. Parole boards are required to inquire of inmates what 
steps, if any, they have taken toward rehabili tation, but still have discretio n aStO" w1ia1;,,m be 
discussed during a parole interv_iew. See, Briguglio v. NYS Bd. of Parole, i4 NY2d 21 [l 969J. 
The tnnscript of the proceedings shows Conunissioner Crnngle asked questions of and 
discussed Petitioner 's training and programming. Commissioner Crangte asked Petitioner about 
his plans for release 1:1.nd discussed the reality of changes in society facing Petitioner, who was 
incarcerated in the state 1>}'Stem in 1984. There is nothing to suggest either commissioner failed to 
allow Petitioner to make.any comments he wished; in fact, he was given ample opportunity to 
make additional comments at the end of the interview, which he did . Overall, there is nothing in 
1hc record to suggest the board fajled to apply a risk and needs assessment to decermine 
Petitioner's readiness for release, nor does (he transcript support Petitioner's position that the 
inquiry regarding h.is rehabilitative efforts was "perfunctory." See, Coaxum 11. New York state 
Board of Parole, 14 Misc3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Coj. 
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While this Court commends Petirioner on his programming accomplishments and overall 
good disciplinary history, this Court sees no reason to disrurb the parole board's decision. The 
record does not support Petitioner's arguments. 
Based upon the above, it is 
ORDERED, that the petition seeking Article 78 relief is denied in its entirety and 
dismissed. 
Th.is shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Coun. 
DATED: November 28, 2012 
Monticello, New York 
Hon. Frank J. LaBuda 
Acting Supreme Court Justice 
